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Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the
assumption of single-photon light source or on the assumption of single-photon input of the receiver
side. These assumptions impose restrictions on the class of possible eavesdropping strategies. Here
we present a security proof without these assumptions and, thus, solve this important problem and
prove the security of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch against general attacks. In particular,
we develop an adaptation of the decoy state method to the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is aimed to provide
unconditionally secure communication. The notion of
unconditional security means that an eavesdropper is al-
lowed to have unlimited computational power. In theory,
the eavesdropper is restricted only by quantum mechan-
ics. The first QKD protocol was discovered by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984 [1] and is thus called the BB84 pro-
tocol. A number of unconditional security proofs for the
BB84 protocol were proposed [2–8], which gave rise to a
beautiful mathematical theory.
Security proofs for practical implementations of QKD
protocols faces with various problems caused by certain
imperfections in apparatus setups [9–11], which should be
taken into account in security proofs. This paper is de-
voted to the problem of the efficiency mismatch between
different threshold single-photon detectors.
In the BB84 protocol (as well as in other discrete-
variable QKD protocols) information is encoded in the
polarization or phase of weak coherent pulses simulat-
ing true single-photon states. Single-photon detectors
are used on the receiver side to read the information en-
coded in such states. Ideally, a single-photon detector
fires whenever it is hit by at least one photon. However,
a realistic detector is triggered by one photon only with a
certain probability 0 < η ≤ 1, which is referred to as the
efficiency of a detector. Typical value of η for the detec-
tors used in practical QKD systems (based on avalanche
photodiodes) is 0.1. The detectors based on supercon-
ductors have η ≈ 0.9, but they are more expensive and
require cryogenic temperatures.
In this paper we will consider the BB84 protocol with
the active basis choice. In this case, two single-photon
detectors are used on the receiver side: One for the sig-
nals encoding bit 0 and one for the signals encoding bit
1, respectively. Imperfect efficiencies of the detectors,
i.e., η < 1, is not a problem whenever the efficiencies
of the detectors coincide with each other, because the
loss in the detection rate can be treated as a part of
transmission loss followed by ideal detectors with perfect
efficiency. But even a small difference of the detectors’
efficiencies make the aforementioned security proofs inap-
plicable. Since the detection loss is different for different
detectors, we cannot anymore treat the detection loss as
a part of the common transmission loss. This is a se-
rious problem since, in practice, it is hard to build two
detectors with exactly the same efficiencies.
Detection-efficiency mismatch leads to unequal fre-
quencies of zeros and ones in the so called raw key. In-
deed, if, for example, the efficiency of the detector for the
signals encoding bit 0 is higher than that of the detector
for the signals encoding bit 1, then the frequency of zeros
will be greater then the frequency of ones. This gives a
priori information on the raw key to the eavesdropper.
Analysis of possible attacks on a QKD protocol with such
a priori information is challenging.
The first security proof for the BB84 protocol with
detection-efficiency mismatch was proposed in Ref. [12].
In Ref. [13], higher secret key rates for BB84 with
detection-efficiency mismatch were obtained numerically,
which were confirmed analytically in Refs. [14, 15]. Also
the decoy state method was adopted to the case of
detection-efficiency mismatch in Ref. [14]. In all these
works, an essential restriction on the class of attacks al-
lowed to the eavesdropper is imposed: she is not allowed
to add photons to the single-photon pulses. However, in
the general case, the technologically unlimited eavesdrop-
per can increase the number of photons in the pulses, for
example, to increase the probability of detection of the
desired positions on the receiver side.
In the case of equal detection efficiencies, the reduction
of the multiphoton (infinite-dimensional) input on the
receiver side to the single-photon (finite-dimensional) in-
put is provided by the so called squashing model [16].
Squashing model is a special map from an infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space to a finite-dimensional one,
which gives the same statistics of measurement results.
However, there is no squashing model for the detection-
efficiency mismatch case, hence, the multiphoton input
on the receiver side should be analyzed explicitly.
Recently, another work [17] was published, where the
security of the BB84 protocol with detection-efficiency
mismatch was analyzed for the multiphoton input on
the receiver side using the numerical optimization tech-
niques. The security is proved there under a conjecture,
2which is confirmed only numerically. Namely, in Ref. [17],
it is conjectured that the minimal rate of double clicks for
n > 3 photons on the receiver side is not smaller than this
quantity for n = 3. A similar conjecture for the minimal
mean error rate is also used. Here we rigorously prove a
variant of such conjecture for the double click rates using
the entropic uncertainty relations, see Proposition 3. So,
our Proposition 3 may serve as the lacking part for the
analysis in Ref. [17].
Another improvement of our work is an analytic deriva-
tion of an expression for the secret key rate rather than
numerical methods. To be more accurate, we reduce the
lower bound for the secret key rate to minimization of
a one-dimensional convex function, which is much eas-
ier than a multidimensional problem of semidefinite pro-
gramming used in Ref. [17].
The obtained almost explicit formula for the secret key
rate allows us to generalize the results to the practical
case of weak coherent pulses on the sender (Alice’s) side.
Namely, Ref. [17] relaxes the assumption that the re-
ceiver’s (Bob’s) input is a single photon, but assumes
that the sender’s output is a single photon. However,
as is well-known, in most implementations, information
is encoded not in true single-photon states but in weak
coherent pulses, which make QKD vulnerable to the pho-
ton number splitting attack [18, 19]. This problem can
be fixed by the decoy state method, which effectively al-
lows us to bound the number of multiphoton pulses from
above [20–24]. The usual decoy state method is formu-
lated for the case of no detection-efficiency mismatch.
So, a generalization of a security proof for the BB84
protocol with with detection-efficiency mismatch to the
case of weak coherent pulses is not straightforward. In
Ref. [14], an adaptation of the decoy state method to the
case of detection-efficiency mismatch was proposed under
the additional assumption that the eavesdropper cannot
add photons to single-photon pulses. Here we relax this
assumption and present an adaptation of the decoy state
method for the case of no detection-efficiency mismatch
in the general case.
Thus, we solve an important problem for practical
QKD and prove the security of the BB84 protocol with
detection-efficiency mismatch for the multiphoton case
on both Alice’s output and Bob’s input.
Finally, let us note that simple random discarding of
some detection events of the detector with a higher effi-
ciency does not work. Of course, this allows us to balance
the number of ones and zeros in the raw key. However,
this solution faces two problems. The first one is that
it requires the precise knowledge of both efficiencies. In
contrast, our method requires only the knowledge of a
lower bound of the ratio η of the lower efficiency to the
higher one. The second problem, which is the main one,
is that the eavesdropper can again violate the balance be-
tween the number of ones and zeros by adding photons to
the pulses, which increases the probability of detection in
the desired detector. So, random discarding works only
under the assumption that the eavesdropper cannot add
photons to the pulses, which we want to get rid of.
The following text is organized as follows. In Sec. II we
present preliminary information: a detection model and
a brief description of the BB84 protocol. In Sec. III, we
formulate the results for the case of single-photon Alice’s
output. In Sec. IV, we present an adaptation of the decoy
state method. In Sec. V, we prove the main theorem
(Theorem 1) of Sec. III.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Detection model
We start with the description of a detection model.
We will adopt the common names for the communica-
tion parties: Alice for the transmitting side, Bob for the
receiver side, and Eve for the eavesdropper. Alice and
Bob are also referred to as the legitimate parties.
The information is encoded in quantum states of the
two-dimensional single-photon Hilbert space C2. The el-
ements of the standard basis (z basis) will be denoted
as |0〉 and |1〉. The elements of the Hadamard basis (x
basis) will be denoted as
|+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
= H |0〉 ,
|−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
= H |1〉 ,
(1)
where H is the so called Hadamard transformation.
The n-photon space is (C2)⊗sn, where ⊗s is a sym-
metrized tensor product. If n = 0, then (C2)⊗s0 = C
– a one-dimensional complex vector space spanned by
the vacuum vector |vac〉. The arbitrary number of pho-
tons corresponds to the bosonic Fock space F(C2) =⊕∞
n=0(C
2)⊗sn. Denote c†z0 (cz0), c
†
z1 (cz1), c
†
x0 (cx0), and
c†x1 (cx1) the creation (annihilation) operators of a pho-
ton in the states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉, respectively. They
are related to each other as
cxa =
cz0 + (−1)acz1√
2
, a = 0, 1. (2)
Denote
|n0, n1〉b =
(c†b0)
n0
√
n0!
(c†b1)
n1
√
n1!
|vac〉 . (3)
The C2 space is naturally embedded into F(C2) if we
identify |a〉 = c†za |vac〉 and H |a〉 = c†xa |vac〉, a ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the case of the perfect detection, i.e., each
detector fires whenever it is hit by at least one pho-
ton. Then, the measurement in the basis b ∈ {z, x} is
described by the probability operator valued measure
(POVM) {P˜∅, P˜0, P˜1, P˜01}, where the operators corre-
spond to four possible outcomes: no click, only detector
30 clicks, only detector 1 clicks, and both detector click
(double click), and
P˜∅ = |vac〉 〈vac| ,
P˜
(b)
0 =
∞∑
n0=1
|n0, 0〉b 〈n0, 0| ,
P˜
(b)
1 =
∞∑
n1=1
|0, n1〉b 〈0, n1| ,
P˜
(b)
01 =
∞∑
n0,n1=1
|n0, n1〉b 〈n0, n1| .
(4)
Now let us describe the imperfect detection. Let η0
and η1 be the efficiencies of the detectors and, say, 0 <
η1 ≤ η0 ≤ 1. If we adopt an approximation that the
imperfect detection can be modeled by an asymmetric
beam splitter followed by a perfect detection, then, as
shown in Ref. [25], the efficiencies can be renormalized as
η′0 = 1 and η
′
1 = η1/η0 = η. The common loss 1 − η0 in
both detectors can be treated as additional transmission
loss. So, in the aforementioned approximation, without
loss of generality, we assume that η0 = 1 and η1 = η, 0 <
η ≤ 1. Then the imperfect detection can be described by
the POVM {P∅, P0, P1, P01}:
P∅ =
∞∑
n1=0
(1 − η)n1 |0, n1〉b 〈0, n1| ,
P
(b)
0 =
∞∑
n0=1
∞∑
n1=0
(1 − η)n1 |n0, n1〉b 〈n0, n1| ,
P
(b)
1 =
∞∑
n1=1
[1− (1− η)n1 ] |0, n1〉b 〈0, n1| ,
P
(b)
01 =
∞∑
n0,n1=1
[1− (1 − η)n1 ] |n0, n1〉b 〈n0, n1| .
(5)
The mismatch parameter η is assumed to be constant
and known to both legitimate parties and the eavesdrop-
per. This means that we consider detection-efficiency
mismatch due to manufacturing and setup, not by Eve’s
manipulations. Denote also the probability that detec-
tor 1 clicks when it is hit by exactly n photons:
θn = 1− (1− η)n. (6)
In fact, as we will discuss later in Remark 7, our analy-
sis will rely neither on the precise form (5) of the POVM
nor on the precise formula (6) for θn. However, we will
essentially use the reduction to the case η0 = 1. So,
we assume that detector 0 (the detector with a larger
efficiency) can be modeled by a beam splitter with the
transmission coefficient η0 followed by a perfect detec-
tion, but detector 1 is not assumed to be equivalent to
this model.
B. Brief description of the BB84 protocol
In this subsection, we briefly describe the BB84 proto-
col. For more details see, e.g., Refs. [9, 10, 26]. We start
with the prepare&measure formulation, where Alice pre-
pares single-photon states and sends them to Bob, who
measures them.
(1) Alice randomly chooses N bases b = b1 . . . bN , bi ∈
{z, x}. These random choices are independent and iden-
tically distributed. Denote pz and px = 1− pz probabili-
ties of choosing the z basis and the x basis, respectively.
Bob also randomly generates N bases b′ = b′1 . . . b
′
N ,
b′i ∈ {z, x} with the same distribution, independently
of the Alice’s choices.
(2) Alice randomly generates a large number N of
bits a = a1 . . . aN , ai ∈ {0, 1}. These random bits are
independent and uniformly distributed. Then Alice pre-
pares N quantum states |ai〉 ∈ C2 for bi = z and H |ai〉
for bi = x, i = 1, . . . , N , and sends them to Bob. Bob
measures them according to POVM (4) with b = bi for
a given position i and records the results a′ = a′1 . . . a
′
N :
no click corresponds to a′i = ∅, a click of detector 0 or 1
corresponds to a′i = 0 or a
′
i = 1, respectively. In case of
a double click, Bob randomly (with equal probabilities)
chooses a′i = 0 or a
′
i = 1. But also he can also calcu-
late the number of double clicks (this will be used in the
analysis). The strings a and a′ are referred to as the raw
keys.
(3) Using a public authentic classical channel, Alice
and Bob announce their bases (the strings b and b′),
also Bob announces the positions where he has obtained
a click (no matter single or double). We adopt a version
of the protocol where only the z basis is used for key
generation. So, Alice and Bob keep positions where bi =
b′i = z and Bob obtained a click. Denote the strings with
only such positions as a˜ and a˜′, which are referred to as
the sifted keys. The other (dropped) positions still can
be used for estimation of the achievable key generation
rate.
(4) Communicating over the public authentic classical
channel, Alice and Bob estimate the Eve’s information
about the Alice’s sifted key and either abort the protocol
(if this information is too large) or perform procedures
of error correction and privacy amplification to obtain a
final key. The former allows them to fix the discrepancies
between their sifted keys. Here we adopt a version where
positions where a˜i 6= a˜′i are treated as the Bob’s errors.
During the error correction procedure, Bob corrects these
errors and obtains the key identical to the Alice’s one, i.e.,
a˜.
In the privacy amplification procedure, Alice and Bob
apply a randomly generated special map (a hash func-
tion) to the sifted key and obtain a shorter key, which is
a final key. Alice and Bob must have an upper bound for
the Eve’s information about the Alice’s sifted key a˜ (or,
equivalently, a lower bound on the Eve’s ignorance about
the Alice’s sifted key) to calculate the length l of the final
key such that the eavesdropper has only an infinitesimal
4(as N → ∞) information about the final key. The cor-
responding ratio l/N will be referred to as the secret key
rate. See Ref. [27] for a formal definition of secret key
rate. Here we do not need a formal definition. Actually,
we will use formula (12) below as the starting formula for
the secret key rate. Note that sometimes secret key rate
is defined as the ratio of l to the length of the sifted key
(rather than the raw one).
In this paper, we consider only the asymptotic case
N →∞ and do not address the finite-key effects. In this
case, we can put px ∼ 1/
√
N → 0, pz → 1.
For mathematical analysis of the security of the proto-
col, it is convenient to reformulate it in terms of an equiv-
alent entanglement-based version. In the entanglement-
based version of the protocol, step (2) in the description
above is altered. Alice does not generate the string a
and does not prepare and send quantum states. Instead,
a source of entangled states generates a state
ρAB = |Φ+〉 〈Φ+| (7)
in the Hilbert space C2 ⊗F(C2), where
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉z + |1〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉z)
=
1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉x + |−〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉x) ∈ C2 ⊗F(C2).
and sends the first subsystem (a qubit) to Alice and the
second one to Bob. Then, like Bob, Alice performs a
measurement in the basis bi (the POVM {|0〉 , |1〉} for
the z basis and {|0〉 , |1〉} for the x basis) and records the
result ai. Since the Alice’s measurement is virtual, her
measurement corresponds to detectors with the perfect
efficiencies. This scheme is also referred to as the source
replacement scheme.
In the entanglement-based QKD, Eve is assumed to
control the source of entangled states, i.e., she can re-
place the density operator ρAB given in (7) by her own
arbitrary density operator ρABE acting on the Hilbert
space C2⊗F(C2)⊗HE ≡ HA⊗HB⊗HE , whereHE is an
arbitrary separable Hilbert space. Eve is assumed to own
the additional register E corresponding to the space HE .
The transmission loss in the original prepare&measure
formulation can be included in the state ρABE . But the
detection loss is basis-dependent in the case of detection-
efficiency mismatch and cannot be included in ρABE .
III. FORMULATION OF RESULTS FOR THE
CASE OF SINGLE-PHOTON ALICE’S OUTPUT
A. Problem statement
Let us adopt the following common agreement: For
any tripartite density operator ρABE , the notations like
ρAB, ρB, etc. mean ρAB = TrE ρABE , ρB = TrAE ρABE ,
etc. Denote T(H) the space of trace-class operators on
a Hilbert space H. If H is finite-dimensional, then T(H)
coincides with the space of all linear operators on H. If
Φ is a quantum transformation acting on, for example,
Bob’s Hilbert space, i.e., Φ is a linear map from T(F(C2))
to itself, then Φ(ρABE) ≡ (IdA⊗Φ⊗ IdE)(ρABE) with Id
being the identity quantum transformation on the corre-
sponding Hilbert space. Also denote IdBE = IdB ⊗ IdE .
Let, as before, ρABE is a tripartite density operator
corresponding to a sending. Denote
ρ′ABE = G(ρABE) ≡ GρABEG, (8)
where
G =
√
IB − P (z)∅ . (9)
IA,B,E are the identity operators in the corresponding
Hilbert spaces. Also we will use the denotation IBE =
IB⊗IE . Transformation (8) corresponds to the following
partial measurement: Instead of the full measurement in
the z basis described by Eq. (5), we just check whether we
obtain a detection or not. If we do not obtain a detection,
we sift this position out. In other words, Eq. (8) is a post-
selection map. Then
pdet = Tr ρ
′
ABE ≤ 1
is the detection probability for Bob if he measures in
the z basis. Since Bob announces the positions where
he has obtained a click, this quantity is known to the
legitimate parties. Denote also ρ˜′ABE = p
−1
detρ
′
ABE the
corresponding normalized state.
Alice’s measurement in the z basis and the x basis can
be described by the decoherence maps Z and X in the
corresponding bases:
Z(ρA) =
1∑
a=0
|a〉 〈a| ρA |a〉 〈a| ,
X (ρA) =
1∑
a=0
(H |a〉 〈a|H)ρA(H |a〉 〈a|H).
(10)
Denote
ρ˜′ZBE = Z(ρ˜′ABE),
ρ˜′XBE = X (ρ˜′ABE).
(11)
According to the Devetak–Winter theorem [27], the
secret key rate is given by
K = pdet[H(Z|E)ρ˜′ −H(Z|B)ρ˜′ ], (12)
where the conditional von Neumann entropies are calcu-
lated for the state ρ˜′ZBE . Here we have taken into ac-
count that only the positions where both legitimate par-
ties used z basis participate in the sifted key and pz → 1
as N →∞.
The first and the second terms in the brackets in
Eq. (12) characterize the Eve’s and Bob’s ignorances
about the Alice’s sifted key bit, respectively. Here we
assume that the length of the error-correcting syndrome
5is given by the Shannon theoretical limit. Otherwise, a
factor f > 1 should be added to the second term. The
present-day error-correcting codes allow for f = 1.22. A
method of using of the low-density parity-check codes in
QKD, which allows us to decrease the factor f , is given in
Refs. [28, 29]. A syndrome-based QBER estimation algo-
rithm, which also can decrease f , is proposed in Ref. [30].
Using the Fano’s inequality, the second term in the
right-hand side of Eq. (12) is bounded from above by
h(Qz), where h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) (log ≡
log2) is the binary entropy and Qz is the quantum bit
error rate (QBER), i.e., error ratio in the z basis. This
value is observed by Alice and Bob, hence, thus term is
known by the legitimate parties. Formally, Qz is defined
as
Qz = p
−1
detTr(ρAB |0〉 〈0| ⊗ P (z)1 + |1〉 〈1| ⊗ P (z)0 ) (13)
But the first term (Eve’s ignorance) is unknown to Al-
ice and Bob since the state ρABE is chosen by Eve. They
should estimate the Eve’s ignorance from below using the
observable data. To simplify the problem and eliminate
the dependence of the right-hand side of Eq. (12) on the
Eve’s subsystem, we apply the entropic uncertainty rela-
tions [32, 33]:
H(Z|E)ρ˜′ +H(X |B)ρ˜′ ≥ 1, (14)
where the second conditional entropy is calculated for the
state ρ˜′XBE , or, equivalently, ρ˜
′
XB.
So, the secret key rate is lower bounded by
K ≥ pdet[1− sup
ρAB∈S
H(X |B)ρ˜′ − h(Qz)], (15)
where
S = {ρAB ∈ T(HA ⊗HB)‖ ρ ≥ 0, TrΓiρAB = γi,
i = 1, . . . ,m}. (16)
Here Γi are linear operators acting on HA ⊗ HB corre-
sponding to observables of Alice and Bob. They impose
constraints on ρAB since the latter should be consistent
with the observed data.
Note that, in Eq. (15), we should estimate the Bob’s
ignorance about the Alice’s outcome in the x basis for
the state ρ˜′AB, i.e., after the attenuation corresponding
to the measurement in the z basis, see Eq. (8). In the case
of equal detector efficiencies, Alice and Bob can estimate
this entropy in the same way as the last term H(Z|B)
in Eq. (12). Namely, Bob just measures his state in the
x basis, calculates the ratio of discrepancies between his
and the Alice’s results, and use the Fano’s inequality for
the estimation of H(X |B). But in the case of detection-
efficiency mismatch, he cannot proceed in such a way.
Indeed, now the detection loss is basis-dependent, and
the imperfect measurement in the x basis leads to the
state G(x)ρABG
(x), where G(x) =
√
IB − P (x)∅ instead of
ρ′AB = GρABG, where G is given by Eq. (9). This is
the main difficulty in the security analysis for the case of
detection-efficiency mismatch. The inconsistency of the
phase error rate with the bit error rate in the x basis is
a common problem for QKD with device imperfections
[31].
Also note that the conditional entropy can be ex-
pressed as
H(X |B)ρ˜′ = −D(ρ˜′XB‖IA ⊗ ρ˜′B), (17)
where D(σ‖τ) = Trσ log σ − Trσ log τ is the quantum
relative entropy, which is a jointly convex function. So,
problem (15) is a convex minimization problem subject
to linear constraints. In the case of finite-dimensional
HA ⊗HB, it can be solved numerically, as was proposed
in Refs. [13, 34]. But we have an infinite-dimensional
HB, so, analytic bounds for H(X |B) are required.
B. Main theorem and simulation
Consider the following linear constraints:
(1) Probability of detection (for the z basis)
Γ1 = IA ⊗ (IB − P (z)∅ ), TrΓ1ρAB = pdet. (18)
(2) Weighted mean erroneous detection rate in the x
basis
Γ2= η
−1 |+〉 〈+| ⊗
(
P
(x)
1 +
1
2
P
(x)
01
)
+ |−〉 〈−| ⊗
(
P
(x)
0 +
1
2
P
(x)
01
)
, TrΓ2ρAB = q. (19)
This means that, in the case of a double click, a bit value
0 or 1 is assigned with the probability 1/2, but we con-
sider a weighted sum: erroneous ones are taken with the
weight η−1 and erroneous zeros are taken with the weight
1. Also note that q this is not the usual QBER. This is
a weighted sum of probabilities of erroneous detections
rather than the ratio of erroneous detections to all detec-
tions (cf. Eq. (13)).
(3) Probability of a single click of detector 1 for the
measurement in the z basis
Γ3 = IA ⊗ P (z)1 , TrΓ3ρAB = p1. (20)
(4) Mean probability of a double click
Γ4 = IA ⊗ 1
2
(P
(z)
01 + P
(x)
01 ), TrΓ3ρAB = pdc. (21)
Let us define also the following quantities. Note that
the names like “upper bound” and “lower bound” be-
low are given “in advance”, in order to understand their
meaning. The proofs that these quantities are the corre-
sponding bounds will be given in Sec. VE.
(1) pmin01 is the unique root of the equation
2pmin01 log 3 + 2h(p
min
01 ) = 1. (22)
6Numerically, pmin01 ≈ 0.06 (pmindc > 0.06).
(2) The two-photon contribution to the probability of
detection p
(2)
det – a free variable over which the secret key
rate is minimized.
(3) Upper bound on the three- and more photon con-
tribution to the probability of detection:
p
(3+),U
det =
p01
ηpmin01
. (23)
(4) Lower bound on the single-photon contribution to
the probability of detection:
p
(1),L
det = pdet − p(2)det − p(3+),Udet . (24)
(5) Upper bound on the two-photon contribution to
the probability of a single click of detector 1:
p
(2),U
1 = min

p(2)det
2
+
√
2θ2p01p
(2)
det
η
, p
(2)
det

 . (25)
(6) Lower bound on the single-photon contribution to
the probability of a single click of detector 1:
p
(1),L
1 = p1 − p(2),U1 − p(3+),Udet . (26)
(7) Lower bound on the single-photon contribution
to the detection probability in the case of perfect (no
mismatch) detection:
tL1 = p
(1),L
det + p
(1),L
1
(
1
η
− 1
)
. (27)
(8) Lower bound on the two-photon contribution to
the weighted mean erroneous detection rate in the x ba-
sis:
qL2 = max

1 + θ2/η
4
p
(2)
det −
1
η
√
2θ2p01p
(2)
det
η
, 0

 . (28)
(9) Upper bound on the single-photon contribution
to the weighted mean erroneous detection rate in the x
basis:
qU1 = q − qL2 . (29)
(10) Upper bound on the two-photon contribution to
the probability of detection p
(2),U
det . It is defined as the
maximal value p
(2)
det such that p
(1),L
det ≥ 0 (under the as-
sumption pdet > p
(3),U
det ) and δ
L
x ≤ 1, where δLx is defined
in Eq. (31) below.
Theorem 1. Suppose that pdet > p
(3),U
det and q
U
1 < t
L
1/2
for all p
(2)
det ∈
[
0, pdet − p(3),Udet
]
. Then the secret key rate
(15) subject to constraints (18)–(21) is lower bounded by
K ≥ min
p
(2)
det
p
(1),L
det
[
1− h
(
1− δLx
2
)]
− pdeth(Qz), (30)
where
δLx =
√
η(tL1 − 2qU1 )
p
(1),L
det
. (31)
The minimization is performed over the segment p
(2)
det ∈[
0, p
(2),U
det
]
. The expression under minimization in
Ineq. (30) is a convex function of p
(2)
det.
The requirement qU1 < t
L
1/2 essentially means that the
error rate is not too high, see Remark 3 below. If this
condition is not met, Theorem 1 cannot guarantee a pos-
itive secret key rate. If the condition pdet > p
(3),U
det is
not met, then our analysis cannot exclude the situation
where all pulses arriving at the Bob’s side contain three
or more photons, which are treated as insecure. Hence,
Theorem 1 also cannot guarantee a positive secret key
rate.
The calculations of the secret key rate with for-
mula (30) are presented on Fig. 1. For the simulation,
we assume that
ρAB = (1− 2Q) |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|+ 2QI2
2
⊗ I2
2
, (32)
where 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1 and I2 is an identity operator in the
qubit space. In the case of perfect detection, Q is the
probability of error for both bases. The right-hand side
of Eq. (32) is an action of the depolarizing channel on the
maximally entangled state given by Eq. (7). The depo-
larizing channel is a commonly used model for an actual
transmission line (i.e., for the “honest” performance of
the protocol, without eavesdropping). The state given
by Eq. (32) gives pdet = (1 + η)/2, p1 = η/2, and q = Q.
Also we artificially set p01 = 10
−5 due to dark counts.
Strictly speaking, dark counts should be taken into ac-
count explicitly in the detection model, i.e., in Eqs. (4)
and (5). This will be a subject for a future work. We
emphasize that the security proof does not depend on the
specific model (32) used for the simulation.
As an upper bound for the secret key rate, we can use
a tight bound for a single-photon Bob’s input, which was
obtained obtained in Ref. [14] (a particular case of this
bound was also obtained in Ref. [15]), see also Proposi-
tion 2 below with a simplified proof:
K = pdet
[
h
(
1− δz
2
)
− h
(
1−√δ2x + δ2z
2
)]
, (33)
K ≥ pdet
[
1− h
(
1− δx
2
)]
. (34)
where δx and δz are given by Eqs. (65) below. For-
mula (33) is the exact value of the secret key rate in
the case of the additional restriction ρAB ∈ T(C2 ⊗ C2),
i.e., the Bob’s input is single photon. We use it as an
upper bound. Formula (34) gives a simplified and more
rough bound. We will used it (rather than Eq. (33)) for
the derivation of Eq. (30). From Fig. 1, we see that, in
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Figure 1. Secret key of the BB84 protocol vs the efficiency of
one of the detectors η. Another detector and the transmission
line are assumed to be perfect; otherwise, the secret key rate
is reduced by a constant factor. The state ρAB is given by
Eq. (32) with Q = 0.05. This corresponds to pdet = (1+η)/2,
p1 = η/2, and q = Q. Also we artificially set p01 = 10
−5 due
to dark counts. Solid line: formula (30). Dashed line: tight
bound (33) for the single-photon case (used as an upper bound
for the secret key rate). Dotted line: simplified (more rough)
bound (34) for the single-photon case, which was used in the
derivation of formula (30). We see that, for the practical case
of small detection-efficiency mismatch (η close to 1), formula
(30) gives a secret key rate close to the upper bound.
the practical case of small detection-efficiency mismatch
(η close to 1), formula (30) gives a secret key rate close
to both Eqs. (33) and (34).
The decrease of the secret key rate with the decrease of
η shown on Figs. 1 is caused by two effects: the decrease
of the average detector efficiency (1+η)/2 and detection-
efficiency mismatch as such. To distinguish the influence
of the mismatch as such, we compare the secret key rates
for the mismatch case with the detector efficiencies 1 and
η and the no-mismatch case with both efficiencies equal
to (1 + η)/2. The secret key rate for the latter case is
well-known and given by
K = pdet[1− 2h(Q)]. (35)
The ratio of the secret key rate in the mismatch case to
that in the no-mismatch case is shown on Fig. 2. The
solid line corresponds to the errorless case Q = 0 and the
dashed line corresponds to a high error rate Q = 0.09.
Recall that Q ≈ 0.11 is a maximal QBER for which the
key distribution is possible (1 − 2h(Q) > 0). The key
rate Q = 0.09 is high in the sense that it is close to the
critical one Q ≈ 0.11.
We see that, first, the secret key rate is larger influ-
enced by mismatch for high QBERs and, second, if the
mismatch is not very large, then the decrease of the se-
cret key rate is also relatively small even for high QBERs.
For example, the secret key rate for η = 0.8 and Q = 0.09
is above 90% of the secret key rate for the no-mismatch
case with the same Q and average efficiency.
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Figure 2. Decrease of secret key rate in the detection
efficiency-mismatch case with respect to the no-mismatch
case: the ratio of the secret key rate in the mismatch case
with the detector efficiencies 1 and η to the secret key rate in
the no-mismatch case with both efficiencies equal to (1+η)/2.
Solid line: no errors Q = 0, dashed line: relatively high error
rate Q = 0.09 (close to the critical value for the case of perfect
detection Q ≈ 0.11). All other parameters are the same as on
Fig. 1. If the mismatch is small, then the decrease of secret
key rate is relatively small even for high QBERs.
IV. DECOY STATE METHOD IN THE CASE OF
DETECTION-EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
A. Estimations
Now let us take into account that Alice sends not true
single-photon pulses, but weak coherent pulses (with the
randomized phase). We consider the scheme of one sig-
nal state and two weak decoy states. This means that
each Alice’s pulse can be either a signal pulse with the
intensity µs = µ (used for key generation) or one of two
decoy pulses with the intensities µd1 = ν1 and µd2 = ν2,
with the conditions 0 ≤ ν2 < ν1 and ν1 + ν2 < µ.
We follow the method of Ref. [22], where a lower bound
for the number of detections originated from the single-
photon pulses and an upper bound for the error rate for
the single-photon pulses were derived.
The decoy state method for the case of detection-
efficiency mismatch was developed in Ref. [14]. It is ob-
served there that the decoy state estimates of Ref. [22]
have a nice feature that they actually do not impose
any assumptions on the efficiency of detectors. They are
based solely on simple counting of detections and erro-
neous detections. In principle, the decoy state estima-
tions are still valid even if Eve has full control on the
detector efficiencies.
But since formula (30) for the case of single-photon
Alice’s pulses requires some observables (namely, p1, q,
and p01) which does not enter in the corresponding for-
mula (35) for the case of no mismatch, we need to derive
the bounds for these observables using the decoy state
method. This is the only difference of the decoy state
8method in the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
Redenote the quantities pdet, p1, q, and p01 by 1pdet,
1p1, 1q, and 1p01 where the left subindex 1 denotes that
these quantities are conditioned on the single-photon Al-
ice’s pulse (exactly as in Eqs. (18)–(21)). Denote vpdet,
vp1,
vq, and vp01 the analogous quantities conditioned on
the event that Alice sends a weak coherent pulse of the
type v ∈ {s, d1, d2} (i.e., with either the signal intensity
µ or one of two decoy intensities ν1 and ν2). Finally,
denote
s
1pdet = µe
−µ × 1pdet, s1p1 = µe−µ × 1p1, (36)
s
1q = µe
−µ × 1q, s1p01 = µe−µ × 1p01. (37)
These quantities has the following meaning: s1pdet is the
joint probability that a signal pulse contains a single pho-
ton and at least one of the Bob’s detectors clicks (condi-
tioned on the measurement in the basis z), s1p1 is the joint
probability that a signal pulse contains a single photon
and Bob obtains a single click of detector one (condi-
tioned on the measurement in the basis z), etc.
As usual in the decoy state method, we treat multi-
photon Alice’s pulses as insecure. Only the signal pulses
are used for key generation. Thus, the secret key rate is
then lower bounded by
K ≥ min
p
(2)
det
p
(1),L
det
[
1− h
(
1− δLx
2
)]
− spdeth(Qz), (38)
where pdet, p1, q, and p01 should be substituted by
s
1pdet,
s
1p1,
s
1q, and
s
1p01 in all quantities (23)–(29). But the
quantities s1pdet,
s
1p1,
s
1q, and
s
1p01 are not directly ob-
servable. The directly observable quantities are vpdet,
vp1,
vq, and vp01, v ∈ {s, d1, d2}.
The right-hand side of Ineq. (38) is an increasing func-
tion of δLx . Hence, it is an increasing function of
s
1p1 and
a decreasing function of s1p01 and
s
1q. So, we should esti-
mate s1p1 from below and
s
1q and
s
1p01 from above.
The dependence of the right-hand side of Ineq. (38)
on p
(1),L
det is not obvious. So, strictly speaking, we should
minimize also over s1p
L
det ≤ s1pdet ≤ spdet, where the lower
bound s1p
L
det is derived below and the upper bound is obvi-
ous (a joint probability cannot be larger than a marginal
probability). However, in our simulation given below,
the minimum over s1pdet is always achieved in the lower
bound s1p
L
det.
Let us discuss each quantity to be estimated.
(1) 1pdet is the usual yield of single-photon states (de-
noted by Y1 in Refs. [22] and [23]),
vpdet is the overall
gain of the signal states (denoted by Qµ, Qν1 and Qν2 in
Ref. [22] and by Qv in Ref. [23]), and s1pdet is the single-
photon contribution to spdet (denoted by Q
µ
1 , Q
ν1
1 and
Qν21 in Ref. [22] and by Q
v
1 in Ref. [23]). The only dif-
ference is that all our quantities are defined conditioned
on the Bob’s choice of the z basis for measurement. As
we noted above, derivations in the decoy state method
are still valid in the case of detection-efficiency mismatch
because they do not use the assumption of equal effi-
ciencies at all. Thus, we can use the bound derived in
Ref. [22]. Conditioning on the choice of the z basis for
measurement also does not affect the derivation since all
relations used in the derivations in Ref. [22] are still true
if we fix a basis. So,
s
1pdet ≥ s1pLdet =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
×
[
d1pdete
ν1 − d2pdeteν2 − ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(s1pdete
µ − Y L0 )
]
,
(39)
where
Y L0 = max
[
d2pdetν1e
ν2 − d1pdetν2eν1
ν1 − ν2 , 0
]
. (40)
(2) Derivation of the lower bound for s1p1 is completely
the same. The quantity s1pdet is the single-photon contri-
bution to the gain of the signal states conditioned on the
Bob’s choice of the z basis. Analogously, the quantity
s
1p1 is the single-photon contribution to the gain of the
signal states detected solely by detector 1 conditioned on
the Bob’s choice of the z basis. Conditioning on the sin-
gle clicks of detector 1 also does not affect the derivation
in Ref. [22]. Hence, the lower bound for s1p1 (denoted
as s1p
L
1 ) is also given by formulas (39) and (40) where all
vpdet are substituted by
vp1.
(3) An upper bound for s1q was derived in Ref. [14]
also as a simple generalization of derivations in Ref. [22]:
s
1q ≤ s1qU =
[(
d1q(0) + d1q(1)/η
)
eν1
−
(
d2q(0) + d2q(1)/η
)
eν2
] µe−µ
ν1 − ν2 , (41)
where vq(β), β ∈ {0, 1}, is the joint probability that (i)
Alice sends the pulse encoding bit 1 − β and (ii) Bob
obtains a click with the erroneous result β (i.e., he obtains
either a single click of detector β, or a double click with β
as the result of the random bit assignment), conditioned
on the event that the pulse is of the type v and the choice
of the x basis by both legitimate parties.
(4) As for s1p01, we can simply estimate it from above
as s1p01 ≤ sp01. This estimation has the following intu-
itive interpretation. We treat multiphoton Alice’s pulses
as insecure. In the analysis of the case of single-photon
Alice’s pulses, we treated positions with multiphoton
Bob’s inputs as insecure. So, the most pessimistic as-
sumption is that all multiphoton Bob’s inputs originate
from single-photon Alice’s pulses: This assumption max-
imizes the number of insecure positions.
Thus, we have obtained all required estimations and
finished the adaptation of the decoy state method to the
case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
B. Simulation
The results of calculations of the secret key rate for
the decoy state protocol is given on Fig. 3. The param-
9eters have been chosen as follows: the intensity of the
signal state µ = 0.5, the intensities of two decoy states
ν1 = 0.1 and ν2 = 0, the fiber attenuation coefficient
δ = 0.2 dB/km, additional losses in the Bob’s optical
scheme tBob = 5 dB, the efficiencies of the detectors
η0 = 0.1 and η1 = 0.09 (i.e., η = η1/η0 = 0.9), and
the dark count probability per pulse for each detector
Y
(0)
0 = Y
(1)
0 = 10
−5. For simplicity of the simulation,
we neglect the optical error probability, i.e., assume that
the interferometer is adjusted perfectly. This probabil-
ity is typically small, so the inclusion of it will lead to
corrections of a higher order of smallness.
For the calculation of the actual values of these quan-
tities, we employ the standard model of losses and errors
in a fiber-based QKD setup; see, e.g., Ref. [22]. The
probability that a photon emitted by Alice will reach the
Bob’s detectors is 10−(δl+δBob)/10, where l is the trans-
mission distance in kilometers. Since this probability is
rather small even for l = 0 and is very small for realistic
distances, the probability that an Alice’s i-photon state
reaches the Bob’s detectors can be approximately taken
as n10−(δl+δBob)/10. This approximation actually means
that we neglect the possibility that more than one photon
from the Alice’s pulse will reach the Bob’s detectors.
Then the actual values vpβ, β ∈ {0, 1}, are given by
vpβ = Y
(β)
0 +
1
2
∞∑
n=0
µnv
n!
e−µvn10−(δl+δBob)/10ηβ
= Y
(β)
0 +
1
2
µv10
−(δl+δBob)/10ηβ (42)
The right-hand side of this formula expresses the fact the
the detector clicks either due to a dark count or due to a
detection of a photon. We neglect the probability of the
joint events of a dark count and a detection of a photon
since both probabilities are small and this joint probabil-
ity is of the second order of smallness. We stress that this
assumption is not a part of the security proof and used
only for the simulation. The factor 1/2 in the second
term of the right-hand side of Eq. (42) is the probability
that the Alice’s bit is equal to β (hence, the pulse reaches
the detector β and not the detector 1− β).
Then we have vpdet =
vp0 +
vp1. Here the probability
of a double click has a higher order of smallness and,
hence, is neglected.
However, we should estimate the mean probability of
a double click for the formula (38) because, in this for-
mula, it is required per se, not as a small correction to
another term. It occurs in the case of either two dark
counts, or detection of two photons by different detec-
tors, or a dark count in one detector and a detection of
a photon by the other detector. Since we neglect the
optical error, a detection of two photons by different de-
tectors may occur only if the Alice’s and Bob’s bases are
different. In this case, the probability that two photons,
which have reached the detectors, “choose” different de-
tectors, is 1/2. If the pulse has n detectors, then the
binomial coefficient n(n − 1)/2 is a number of ways to
choose two photons from n. So,
sp
(b)
01 = Y
(0)
0 Y
(1)
0 +
Y
(0)
0 η1 + Y
(1)
0 η0
2
µv10
−(δl+δBob)/10 +
+
1
2
∞∑
n=2
n(n− 1)
2
µn
n!
e−µ
(
10−(δl+δBob)/10
)2
× (1 − pb)η0η1
= Y
(0)
0 Y
(1)
0 +
Y
(0)
0 η1 + Y
(1)
0 η0
2
µv10
−(δl+δBob)/10 +
+
µ2
4
(
10−(δl+δBob)/10
)2
(1− pb)η0η1,
sp01 =
sp
(z)
01 +
sp
(x)
01
2
, (43)
where, as before, b ∈ {z, x} is the basis and pz is the
probability of choosing the basis b. Note that sp01 does
not depend on pb.
Since we neglect the optical error, an erroneous detec-
tion occurs only in the case of a dark count (which is
erroneous with the probability 1/2): vq(β) = Y
(β)
0 /2.
On Fig. 3, we compare the secret key rate according to
formula (38) with the decoy state method estimates and
the secret key rate in the case of no efficiency mismatch
but the same average detection efficiency (η0+η1)/2 (i.e.,
formula (35) combined with the usual decoy state esti-
mates). The ratio of the secret key rate in the first case
to that in the second case (an analogue of Fig. 2) is shown
on Fig. 4. Again (as on Figs. 1 and 2), from Fig. 3 and 4,
we see that the reduction of the secret key rate due to
detection-efficiency mismatch is almost negligible when-
ever the mismatch is small.
The initial increase of the ratio on Fig. 4 (with the
maximum on the distance approximately 80 km) is
caused by the decrease of the double click rate for large
distances due to transmission loss.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. General facts
Proposition 1. Let Φ be a completely positive and trace-
preserving map acting on T(HA ⊗HB) which commutes
with X ⊗ IdBE and G and satisfies Φ†(Γi) = Γi for all i.
We assume that pdet given by (18) is included in the set
of restrictions. Then
sup
ρAB∈S
H(X |B)ρ˜′ = sup
ρAB∈S′
H(X |B)ρ˜′ , (44)
where S′ = S ∩ Image(Φ).
Proof. Denote ρ′XB = X (ρ′AB) and, as before, ρ˜′XB =
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Figure 3. Secret key rate of the decoy state BB84 protocol
with detection-efficiency mismatch. The parameters are as
follows: the intensity of the signal state, µ = 0.5; the intensi-
ties of two decoy states, ν1 = 0.1 and ν2 = 0; the fiber atten-
uation coefficient, 0.2 dB/km; additional losses in the Bob’s
optical scheme, 5 dB; the efficiencies of the detectors, η0 = 0.1
and η1 = 0.09 (i.e., η = η1/η0 = 0.9); and the dark count
probability per pulse for each detector, Y β=0
0
= Y β=1
0
= 10−6.
Red dashed line: formula (38) with decoy method estimates.
Blue line: the case of no efficiency mismatch but the same
average detection efficiency (η0 + η1)/2 (like on Fig. 2).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
Transmission distance HkmL
D
ec
re
as
e
o
fs
ec
re
tk
ey
ra
te
Figure 4. Decrease of secret key rate in the detection
efficiency-mismatch case with respect to the no-mismatch case
in the case of decoy state protocol: the ratio of the secret key
rate in the mismatch case with the detector efficiencies 1 and
η to the secret key rate in the no-mismatch case with both
efficiencies equal to (1+η)/2 (like on Fig. 2). The parameters
are as on Fig. 3.
p−1detX (ρ′AB). We have
−pdetH(X |B)ρ˜′ = pdetD(ρ˜′XB‖IA ⊗ ρ˜′B)
= D(ρ′XB‖IA ⊗ ρ′B)
= D(X (G(ρAB))‖IA ⊗ G(ρB))
≤ D(Φ(X (G(ρAB)))‖Φ(IA ⊗ G(ρB)))
= D(X (G(Φ(ρAB)))‖IA ⊗ Φ(G(ρB)))
= pdetH(X |B)Φ(ρ˜′)
(45)
Here we have used monotonicity of quantum relative en-
tropy under the action of a CPTP map on both argu-
ments. Ineq. (45) means that the substitution of ρAB by
Φ(ρAB) does not decrease H(X |B). Since Φ†(Γi) = Γi
for all i, Φ(ρAB) satisfies all restrictions whenever ρAB
does. Also we have used that pdet is also included in
the set of restrictions and, hence, is not changed under
the action of Φ. Thus, for each ρAB ∈ S, there exists
Φ(ρAB) ∈ S′ with the same or a greater value of the ob-
jective function. Hence, the supremum of H(X |B) on S′
coincides with that of on S.
Note that if Φ is a projector, i.e. Φ2 = Φ, then S′ can
be rewritten as
S′ = S ∩ {ρAB ‖Φ(ρAB) = ρAB}. (46)
This means that the optimization can be performed only
over the states that are invariant with respect to the map
Φ.
Let us define the decoherence map with respect to the
total number of photons:
Φ1(ρ) =
∞∑
n=0
ΠnρΠn, (47)
where
Πn =
n∑
k=0
|k, n− k〉z 〈k, n− k|
=
n∑
k=0
|k, n− k〉x 〈k, n− k| .
Φ1 satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1 for the con-
straints (18)–(21) and Φ1 is a projector. Hence, we can
take ρAB invariant under this map: ρAB = Φ1(ρAB).
Hence, ρAB and ρXB are mixtures of contributions with
a certain number of photons. This is a formal proof of the
observation in Ref. [25] that, without loss of generality,
we can assume that a quantum non-demolition measure-
ment of the number of photons if performed before the
actual measurement (4). So,
11
ρXB =
∞∑
n=0
ρ
(n)
XB, ρ
(n)
XB ∈ T(C2 ⊗ (C2)⊗sn), (48)
ρXB =
1
2
(
|+〉 〈+| ⊗ ρ(+)B + |−〉 〈−| ⊗ ρ(−)B
)
, (49)
ρ
(±)
B =
∞∑
n=0
ρ
(n,±)
XB , ρ
(n,±)
XB ∈ T((C2)⊗sn). (50)
ρ′XB =
∞∑
n=1
Gnρ
(n)
XBGn, (51)
Gn =


1
. . . √
θn

 = IB − (1−√θn) |0, n〉z 〈0, n| ,
(52)
where the matrix representation is given in the basis
{|k, n− k〉z}nk=0 of the space (C2)⊗sn. Denote also
tn = Tr ρ
(n)
XB, t =
∞∑
n=1
tn, (53)
p
(n)
det = TrΓ1ρ
(n)
XB, pdet =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
det, (54)
qn = TrΓ2ρ
(n)
XB, q =
∞∑
n=1
qn. (55)
Define the probability of either a single click of detector
0 or a double click:
p0+01 = Tr ρB
(
P
(z)
0 + P
(z)
01
)
= pdet − p1, (56)
and the contributions of the n-photon part to p0+01 and
p1:
p
(n)
0+01 = Tr ρ
(n)
B
(
P
(z)
0 +P
(z)
01
)
, p
(n)
1 = Tr ρ
(n)
B P
(z)
1 , (57)
p0+01 =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
0+01, p1 =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
1 , (58)
We have
p
(n)
det = p
(n)
0+01 + p
(n)
1 , pdet = p0+01 + p1, (59)
tn = p
(n)
0+01 +
p
(n)
1
θn
, t = p0+01 +
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
1
θn
. (60)
Remark 1. Imperfect detection of detector 1 turns some
potential double clicks into single clicks of detector 0 and
some potential single clicks of detector 1 into no clicks.
So, only the signals which lead to a single click of detec-
tor 1 in the case of perfect detection can be lost in the
case of the imperfect one. The terms p
(n)
1 /θn mean that
the fraction θn is lost on detector 1 from the n-photon
part.
We have
pdetH(X |B)ρ˜′ =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
detH(X |B)(n), (61)
where the conditional entropy H(X |B)(n) is calculated
for the state
(
p
(n)
det
)−1
Gnρ
(n)
XBGn. Due to (15), we should
estimate H(X |B)ρ˜′ from above. Using the trivial upper
bound H(X |B)(n) ≤ 1 for n ≥ 2, we obtain
pdetH(X |B)ρ˜′ ≤ p(1)detH(X |B)(1) +
(
pdet − p(1)det
)
. (62)
Thus, our plan is to estimate H(X |B)(1) from above
for a single-photon part ρ
(1)
XB and to estimate the required
parameters of ρ
(1)
XB (for example, p
(1)
det) using the known
observables for the whole state ρAB.
B. Single-photon part
An analytic formula of the tight bound for the single-
photon case was obtained in [14]. Here we present a
simplified proof of it.
Proposition 2. For any ρ
(1)
XB ∈ T(C2 ⊗ C2), ρ(1)XB ≥ 0,
the following inequality is satisfied
q1
t1
≥ 1
2
−
√
p
(1)
0 p
(1)
1
η
, (63)
where p
(1)
0 = Tr ρ
(1)
B P
(z)
0 = p
(1)
det − p(1)1 (the probability of
click of detector 0), and
H(X |B)(1) ≤ 1 + h
(
1−
√
δ2x + δ
2
z
2
)
− h
(
1− δz
2
)
,
(64)
where
δz =
p
(1)
0 − p(1)1
p
(1)
det
, δx =
√
η(t1 − 2q1)
p
(1)
det
. (65)
The right-hand side of Ineq. (64) is a non-decreasing
function of δx and δz. In particular, a simplified formula
(obtained by setting δz = 0) is true:
H(X |B)(1) ≤ h
(
1− δx
2
)
. (66)
Proof. Consider the problem of maximization of
H(X |B)(1) over ρ(1)XB ∈ T(C2 ⊗ C2) with only one con-
straint (18), where Γ1 is substituted by its single-photon
version Π1Γ1Π1. Consider the unitary transformation
Z ⊗ Z, where
Z = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| = |−〉 〈+|+ |+〉 〈−| (67)
(phase flip), and the projector
Φ2(ρ
(1)
XB) =
1
2
[
ρ
(1)
XB + (Z ⊗ Z)ρ(1)XB(Z ⊗ Z)
]
. (68)
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Φ2 satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1. Hence, in
view of (46), we can restrict the set of states ρ
(1)
XB to
those that satisfy Φ2(ρ
(1)
XB) = ρ
(1)
XB, or,
ρ
(1)
XB = (Z ⊗ Z)ρ(1)XB(Z ⊗ Z). (69)
Eqs. (49) and (69) imply that
G1ρ
(1)
XBG1 =
1
2
(
|+〉 〈+| ⊗G1ρ(1,+)B G1+
|−〉 〈−| ⊗G1ρ(1,−)B G1
)
,
(70)
whereG1ρ
(1,−)
B G1 = ZG1ρ
(1,+)G1Z. The the matrix rep-
resentation of the operator G1ρ
(1,+)G1 in the z basis is
G1ρ
(1,+)G1 =
p
(1)
det
2
(
1 + δz δx
δx 1− δz
)
, (71)
where δz and δx are some numbers satisfying the inequal-
ity δ2z + δ
2
x ≤ 1. The matrix representation of the same
operator in the x basis is
G1ρ
(1,+)G1 =
p
(1)
det
2
(
1 + δx δz
δz 1− δx
)
. (72)
We see that
1
p
(1)
det
Tr
[
G1ρ
(1,+)
B G1
(
P˜
(b)
0 − P˜ (b)0
)]
= δb, (73)
b ∈ {x, z}, which explains the denotations δz and δx.
Namely, δb is the difference between the probabilities of
two outcomes in the case of perfect detection for the state
G1ρ
(1,+)
B G1, i.e., for the state attenuated by the imperfect
detection in the z basis. Formula for δz in Eqs. (65) is
now obvious. Also it can be straightforwardly shown that
q1 = Tr
(
Γ
(1)
2 ρ
(1)
XB
)
=
1
2
(
t1 − p
(1)
detδx√
η
)
, (74)
which gives formula for δx in Eqs. (65). Direct calculation
of H(X |B)(1) for the operator (70)–(71) gives Ineq. (64).
Monotonic non-decreasing of the right-hand side of
Ineq. (64) follows from the relation (17) and non-
increasing of the quantum relative entropy under the ac-
tion of a CPTP map on both arguments: As we see from
Eqs. (71) and (72), decrease of δz (δx) corresponds to
(partial) decoherence in the basis x (basis z). Setting
δb = 0 corresponds to full decoherence.
Thus, Eq. (64) is a tight bound, while Eq. (66) is a
simplified and more rough one. In the latter case, (1 −
δx)/p
(1)
det can be identified with the phase error rate, which
plays a crucial role in the security proofs of QKD [4, 6].
As in other cases of practical imperfections, it is not equal
to the bit error rate for the x basis [31].
We will use a simplified formula (66) in our work since
its deviation from a tight bound (64) is small for η close
to 1, which takes place in practice. The substitution of
Ineq. (66) into Ineq. (62) gives
pdetH(X |B)ρ˜′ ≤ p(1)deth
(
1− δx
2
)
+
(
pdet − p(1)det
)
. (75)
We need to estimate δx from below. Hence, in view
of Eq. (65), we should estimate t1 from below and q1
from above. The estimation of t1 will include p
(1)
det (see
Eq. (27)), hence we postpone the investigation of the
dependence of Ineq. (75) on p
(1)
det until we obtain all esti-
mates in Sec. VE.
Remark 2. In Eq. (68), we used a special form of pro-
jector. More generally, consider a unitary representa-
tion {Ug}g∈G of a finite group G of the order |G|,
where each unitary operator Ug acts on HA ⊗ HB . If
Φg(ρAB) = UgρABU
†
g for all g satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 1, then Eq. (44) with
S′ = S ∩ {ρAB ‖UgρABU †g = ρAB for all g} (76)
holds. So, the optimization can be performed only over
the states that are invariant with respect to all unitary
maps. Indeed, consider the map
Φ(ρAB) =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
UgρABU
†
g . (77)
It satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1. Since G is
a group, the right-hand side of Eq. (77) is invariant un-
der the action of each Ug. Hence, Φ is a projector and
Eq. (44) with S′ given by Eq. (46) holds. From the other
side, the invariance under the action of each Ug yields
the invariance under the action of Φ. Hence, Eqs. (46)
and (76) are equivalent for this choice of Φ.
We will not use general formula (76) here, but it can
be useful in other problems: If a problem has a certain
symmetry, then it can be used to restrict the search space
to those that obey the same symmetry.
C. Three- and more photon part
Denote the double click probabilities in the case of per-
fect and imperfect detections:
p˜
(b)
01 = Tr ρAB
(
IA ⊗ P˜ (b)01
)
,
p
(b)
01 = Tr ρAB
(
IA ⊗ P (b)01
)
,
(78)
Define also the corresponding double click probabilities
averaged over two bases (the mean double click probabil-
ities):
p˜01 =
p˜
(z)
01 + p˜
(x)
01
2
, p01 =
p
(z)
01 + p
(x)
01
2
, (79)
b ∈ {z, x}. In force of
P˜
(b)
01 ≥ P (b)01 ≥ ηP˜ (b)01 , (80)
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we have p˜01 ≥ p01 ≥ ηp˜01. The first inequality in
Ineq. (80) means that the imperfect detection turns some
double clicks into single clicks of detector 0. So, some
double clicks are lost in the case of imperfect detection.
The second inequality means that the fraction of such
“lost” double clicks is at most 1− η.
Proposition 3. Consider the state ρXB of form (48).
Then
t3+ ≤ p01
ηpmin01
≡ tU3+, (81)
where t3+ =
∑∞
n=3 tn and p
min
01 is defined by Eq. (22).
We begin with two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Suppose ρB ∈ T((C2)⊗sn) for n ≥ 3 and ρ is
the density operator, i.e., ρB ≥ 0 and Tr ρB = 1. Then
2p˜01 log(2
n−1 − 1) + 2h(p˜01) ≥ n− 2. (82)
Proof. The Hilbert space (C2)⊗sn is naturally embedded
into the space (C2)⊗n. Let us then consider the operators
ρB and P˜
(b)
01 as operators acting on (C
2)⊗n. For a binary
string a = a1 . . . an, denote |a1 . . . an〉 = |a1〉⊗. . .⊗|an〉 ∈
(C2)⊗n. Let |a| denote the Hamming weight of a, i.e., the
number of ones in a. The embedding is as follows:
(C2)⊗sn ∋ |n− k, k〉z =
1√
k!
∑
a∈{0,1}n
|a|=k
|a〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n (83)
Define also the operators corresponding to a double click
in (C2)⊗n:
P¯
(z)
01 =
∑
a∈{0,1}n
1≤|a|≤n−1
|a〉 〈a| ,
P¯
(x)
01 =
∑
a∈{0,1}n
1≤|a|≤n−1
H⊗n |a〉 〈a|H⊗n.
(84)
The operators P¯
(b)
01 differ from the embeddings of P˜
(b)
01 .
However, if ρB ∈ T((C2)⊗sn), i.e., ρB is symmetric with
respect to the permutations of the qubits, then
Tr P˜
(b)
01 ρB = Tr P¯
(b)
01 ρB. (85)
Hence, p˜
(b)
01 can be equivalently defined in terms of P¯
(b)
01 .
Let Z and X be the usual Pauli operators, and let
H(Z⊗n) and H(X⊗n) be the Shannon entropies of the
results of the measurements of the n-qubit observables
Z⊗n and X⊗n, respectively. Then
H(Z⊗n) = h
(
p˜
(z)
01
)
+ p˜
(z)
01 H(Z
⊗n| double click)
+
(
1− p˜(z)01
)
H(Z⊗n| single click)
≤ h
(
p˜
(z)
01
)
+ p˜
(z)
01 log(2
n − 2) + 1− p˜(z)01
= h
(
p˜
(z)
01
)
+ p˜
(z)
01 log(2
n−1 − 1) + 1.
(86)
The inequality takes place since the single click event
corresponds to two outcomes (a = 0 . . . 0 and a = 1 . . . 1)
and the double click corresponds to the rest 2n − 2 out-
comes. Analogously,
H(X⊗n) ≤ h
(
p˜
(x)
01
)
+ p˜
(x)
01 log(2
n−1 − 1) + 1. (87)
From the other side, due to entropy uncertainty relations
[35], we have
H(Z⊗n) +H(X⊗n) ≥ n. (88)
Using Ineqs. (86)–(88) and the concavity of h, we obtain
2p˜01 log(2
n−1 − 1) + 2h(p˜01)
≥
(
p˜
(z)
01 + p˜
(x)
01
)
log(2n−1 − 1) + h
(
p˜
(z)
01
)
+ h
(
p˜
(z)
01
)
≥ n− 2, (89)
q.e.d.
Lemma 2. Suppose n ≥ 3. There is a unique value
p
min,(n)
01 for p
(n)
01 that turns inequality (82) into the equal-
ity. This is a lower bound for the mean double click
probability for a given n. Moreover, p
min,(n)
01 is a non-
decreasing function of n for n ≥ 3.
The proof is technical and does not contain essential
ideas, so, it is given in Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition 3. In force of Lemmas 1 and 2,
1
2tn
Tr ρ
(n)
XB[P˜
(z)
01 + P˜
(x)
01 ] ≥ pmin,(n)01 ≥ pmin01 (90)
for n ≥ 3, where, as before, tn = Tr ρ(n)XB. Note that pmin01 ,
which is defined by Eq. (22), is equal to pmin,(3). Due to
Ineq. (80),
1
2tn
Tr ρ
(n)
XB[P
(z)
01 + P
(x)
01 ] ≥ ηpmin01 . (91)
Then,
p01 =
1
2
∞∑
n=3
Tr ρ
(n)
XB[P
(z)
01 + P
(x)
01 ] ≥ ηt3+pmin01 . (92)
The proposition has been proved.
D. Two-photon part
Unfortunately, bound (82) is trivial for the case n = 2.
The two-photon Bell state
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|2, 0〉z+|0, 2〉z) =
1√
2
(|2, 0〉x+|0, 2〉x) (93)
produces no double clicks in both bases. So, estimation
of the fraction of two-photon pulses requires a separate
analysis.
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The intuition behind the analysis is as follows. If the
number of double clicks is small, then the two-photon
part of the Bob’s state is close to the pure state |Φ+〉.
So, the Bob’s subsystem is almost uncorrelated with the
Alice’s one and the QBER is close to 1/2. By this reason,
as we will see in the next subsection, it is not advanta-
geous for Eve to increase the fraction of two-photon part
of the Bob’s state: she introduces a large number of er-
rors obtaining only a small information about the key.
Proposition 4. The following inequalities for the state
ρXB of form (48)–(50) hold:
q2
t2
≥ 1 + θ2/η
4
− θ2
η
√
2p01
ηt2
, (94)
p
(2)
1
t2
≤ θ2
2
+
√
2p01
ηt2
, (95)
Proof. First consider the case t2 = 1. The vectors |Φ+〉,
|Φ−〉, and |Ψ+〉, where
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|2, 0〉z − |0, 2〉z) = |1, 1〉x ,
|Ψ+〉 = |1, 1〉z =
1√
2
(|2, 0〉x − |0, 2〉x),
(96)
compose a basis in (C2)⊗s2. As we see, the state
|Φ−〉 〈Φ−| produces p˜(z)01 = 0 and p˜(x)01 = 1, while the
state |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−| produces p˜(z)01 = 1 and p˜(x)01 = 0. In both
cases, p˜01 = 1/2. It follows that
p˜01 ≥ 1− 〈Φ
+|ρ(2)B |Φ+〉
2
. (97)
Then,
T (ρ
(2)
B , |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|) ≤
√
1− 〈Φ+|ρ(2)B |Φ+〉 ≤
√
2p˜01,
(98)
where T is the trace distance, and we have used the well-
known relation between the trace distance and the fi-
delity.
If ρ
(2)
XB =
1
2IA⊗ |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|, then q2 = (1+ θ2/η)/4 and
p
(2)
1 = θ2/2. Due to general form (49) of ρXB,
T
(
ρXB,
1
2
IA ⊗ |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|
)
=
1
2
T
(
ρ
(2,+)
B , |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|
)
+
1
2
T
(
ρ
(2,−)
B , |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|
)
≤ 1
2
√
1− 〈Φ+|ρ(2,+)B |Φ+〉+
1
2
√
1− 〈Φ+|ρ(2,−)B |Φ+〉
≤
√
1− 〈Φ+|ρ(2)B |Φ+〉 ≤
√
2p˜01 ≤
√
2p01/η. (99)
Recall the known properties of trace distance: |TrP (ρ−
σ)| ≤ T (ρ, σ) for an arbitrary projector P and, hence,
|TrA(ρ − σ)| ≤ ‖A‖∞T (ρ, σ) for an arbitrary self-
adjoint operator A with the operator norm ‖A‖∞. Since
‖Π2Γ2Π2‖∞ = θ2/η and ‖Π2Γ3Π2‖∞ = θ2, we have∣∣∣∣q2 − 1 + θ2/η4
∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ2η
√
2p01
η
,
∣∣∣∣p(2)1 − θ22
∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ2
√
2p01
η
,
(100)
hence,
q2 ≥ 1 + θ2/η
4
− θ2
η
√
2p01
η
, (101)
p
(2)
1 ≤
θ2
2
+ θ2
√
2p01
η
. (102)
We have obtained the required bound (94) for the case
t2 = 1. If t2 < 1, then all derivations above should be
performed for ρ
(2)
XB/t2. In particular, the observables q2,
p
(2)
1 , and p01 should be substituted by q2/t2, p
(2)
1 /t2, and
p01/t2. Thus, we obtain Eqs. (94) and (95).
E. Final formula and remarks
We proceed to the final steps to the proof of Theorem 1.
Using the inequality
p
(n)
det ≤ tn ≤
p
(n)
det
θn
(103)
(see Eqs. (59) and (60)) and Proposition 4, we have
q2 ≥ 1 + θ2/η
4
p
(2)
det −
1
η
√
2θ2p01p
(2)
det
η
, (104)
p
(2)
1 ≤
p
(2)
det
2
+
√
2θ2p01p
(2)
det
η
, (105)
p
(3+)
det ≤ tU3+ = p(3+),Udet , (106)
where p
(3+)
det =
∑∞
n=3 p
(3)
det. Combination of Ineqs. (104)
and (105) with the obvious estimations q2 ≥ 0 and p(2)1 ≤
p
(2)
det gives estimations q
L
2 and p
(2),U
1 (see Eqs. (28) and
(25)). Estimation (24) is obvious. Then,
p
(1)
1 ≥ p1 − p(2),U1 − p(3+)det = p˜(1),L1 , (107)
t1 ≤ p(1)det +
(
1
η
− 1
)
p˜
(1),L
1 = t˜
L
1 . (108)
So, we have used the simple estimate p
(n)
1 ≤ p(n)det for
n ≥ 3, but a more precise estimate for p(2)1 .
From Ineqs. (15) and (75), we have
K ≥ p(1)det
[
1− h
(
1− δ˜Lx
2
)]
− pdeth(Qz), (109)
where
δ˜Lx =
√
η(t˜L1 − 2qU1 )
p
(1)
det
(110)
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and
p
(1)
det = pdet − p(2)det − p(3+)det ≥ 0, (111)
p
(3+)
det ≤ p(3+),Udet . (112)
The right-hand side of Ineq. (109) should be minimized
over the pairs of positive numbers
(
p
(2)
det, p
(3)
det
)
such that
δ˜Lx ≤ 1 and restrictions (111) and (112) are satisfied.
Denote this set D. As we discuss in Remark 3 below, the
positivity of ρAB guarantees that the set D is not empty.
Replacement of p
(3+)
det by the upper bound p
(3+),U
det in
Eq. (107) and, consequently, in Eqs. (108) and (110) gives
p
(1),L
1 , t
L
1 , and δ
L
x , respectively (see Eqs. (26), (27), and
(31)). This turns Ineq. (109) into the desired Ineq. (30).
But this replacement should be justified.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the
minimum of the right-hand side of Ineq. (109) over(
p
(2)
det, p
(3)
det
) ∈ D is equal to the right-hand side of
Ineq. (30). The expression under minimization in
Ineq. (30) is well-defined for all p
(2)
det ∈
[
0, p
(2),U
det ].
The proof is technical and is given in Appendix B.
To finish the proof of Theorem 1, we need to prove
that the expression under minimization in Ineq. (30) is
a convex function of p
(2)
det. If we redenote p
(1),L
det as an
independent variable x (not to be confused with the
denotation of a basis), then p
(2)
det can be expressed as
p
(2)
det = pdet − p(3),Udet − x, then we can equivalently mini-
mize over x. Since tL1 − 2qU1 is a convex function of x, it
suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider the function of the form
f(x) = xh
(
1
2
− g(x)
x
)
(113)
defined on some segment x ∈ [x0, x1], x0, x1 ≥ 0, where
0 ≤ g(x)x ≤ 12 . If g(x) is convex, then f(x) is concave.
The proof is also technical and is given in Appendix C.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 3. Let us explain the range of variation of p
(2)
det.
There is no positive operator ρAB with p
(2)
det such that
δLx > 1. Indeed, the inequality |δx| ≤ 1 comes from
positivity of ρ
(1)
XB, see the proof of Proposition 2. So,
δx ≥ δLx > 1 implies non-positivity of ρAB. So, positivity
of ρAB implies that the set D above is non-empty. From
the other side, if qU1 ≥ tL1/2, or, in other words, δLx ≤ 0
for some p
(2)
det, then we cannot guarantee a positive secret
key rate (the error rate is too large). Thus, Alice and
Bob must abort the protocol in this case (see step (4) in
the description of the BB84 protocol in Sec. II B).
Remark 4. As we see on Fig. 1, formula (30) gives a sig-
nificant deviation from the upper bound (33) for a large
detection-efficiency mismatch (small η). For η < 0.3, the
formula (30) gives a worse result even in comparison with
the simplified bound (34) for the single-photon Bob’s in-
put. Though, usually the mismatch is not large, here we
discuss a way to improve bound (30). Namely, we can use
a more precise estimate of p
(2)
1 instead of Ineq. (105). In-
deed, in Ineq. (105) (compare with Ineq. (95)), we simply
use the bound t2 ≤ p(2)det/θ2. However, we can estimate t2
and p
(2)
1 using Ineq. (95) and the equation
t2 = p
(2)
det + p
(2)
1
(
1
θ2
− 1
)
. (114)
Then the estimation of t2 and p2 is reduced to a solution
of a quadratic equation.
Remark 5. In the case of no dark counts, we could take
the Γ2 observable (weighted mean erroneous detection
rate in the x basis) as
Γ2 = η
−1 |+〉 〈+| ⊗ P (x)1 + |−〉 〈−| ⊗ P (x)0 (115)
instead of Eq. (19), i.e., do not include the double clicks.
Indeed, we used a non-trivial estimation of H(X |B) only
for the single-photon part, where double clicks are caused
only by dark counts. Though we did not include the dark
counts in our detection model (Eqs. (4) and (5)), we use
more general formula (19). Since dark counts may lead to
double clicks, in the practical case of non-zero dark count
rate, formula (19) should be used. Rigorous inclusion of
dark count rates is a subject for a future work.
Remark 6. Let us discuss the tightness of our bound (80)
for the three- and more photon part of the density op-
erator. We have rigorously proved that the mean dou-
ble click rate for every three- or more photon state is
at least pmin01 ≈ 0.06. From the tight numerical bounds
of Ref. [17], it follows that this bound is approximately
0.25 (under the conjecture that the minimal mean double
click rate is a non-decreasing function of a photon num-
ber). The difference between the tight numerical result
and our analytic bound is larger for the case of efficiency
mismatch.
In the case of the normal operation of a QKD system
(no eavesdropping or eavesdropping that does not change
the statistics of detections), a double click is a rare event
because it occurs in the case of simultaneous occurrence
of two low-probability events: a dark count and a detec-
tion of a photon after the transmission loss. In this case,
as we see on the plots, the derived analytic bound (30)
for the secret key rate is very close to the corresponding
single-photon result: The influence of the multiphoton
part is anyway small. Since the actual double click rate
is low, the difference between bound (80) and the tight
numerical bound is not critical.
In Ref. [17], an example when Eve artificially resends
multiple photons is considered. In this case, double click
may be not a rare event and the numerical method may
give essentially better results. But the aim of the present
paper is a good bound for the normal operation of a QKD
system.
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Remark 7. As we discussed before, Eq. (5) for the POVM
corresponding to an imperfect measurement is valid if the
imperfect detection can be modeled by an asymmetric
beam splitter followed by a perfect detection. This is an
additional assumption. However, as we can observe, the
analysis was relied neither on the precise formula (5) for
the POVM nor on the precise formula (6) for θn. Only
inequality (80) is essential. However, expressions (59)
and (60) and, as a consequence, inequality (103) essen-
tially rely on the fact that one detector has the perfect
efficiency. So, possibility of a reduction to this case is
important. In other words, we assume that detector 0
(the detector with a larger efficiency) can be modeled by
an asymmetric beam splitter followed by a perfect detec-
tion, but detector 1 is not assumed to be equivalent to
this model. If we do not know the precise value of θ2 used
in Proposition 4, then we can use the bounds η ≤ θ2 ≤ 1
instead, which means that the probability of detection of
a two-photon signal is at least as large as the probability
of detection of a single-photon signal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have solved an important problem for practical
QKD and rigorously proved the security of the BB84
protocol with detection-efficiency mismatch for the mul-
tiphoton case on both Alice’s output and Bob’s input.
The main formula of the present paper is (30). It is for-
mulated for the case of single-photon Alice’s pulses, but it
can be adopted to the case of weak coherent pulses with
the randomized phase by the decoy state method. We
have proposed an adaptation of the decoy state method
to the case of detection-efficiency mismatch (as a devel-
opment of our earlier results [14]). The reduction of the
secret key rate due to detection-efficiency mismatch is
almost negligible whenever the mismatch is small.
Also Proposition 1 (with Remark 2) and Propositions 3
and 4 can be of interest in the context of numerical ap-
proach to QKD [13, 17, 25, 34]. Proposition 1 allows
us to reduce the search space and Propositions 3 and 4
allows us to rigorously estimate the number of multipho-
ton events, which was the lacking part of the analysis of
Ref. [17].
An open problem is to include the dark count rates
and, in particular, dark count mismatch in the detection
model. The difference between dark count rates of two
detectors also may affect the security and the secret key
rate.
Another open problem is generalization to the case
when the detection-efficiency mismatch is not constant,
but is under partial Eve’s control, or, in other words,
Eve-induced mismatch rather than mismatch only due
to manufacturing and setup. Such attacks are described
and employed experimentally [36, 37]. In principle, the
combination of Proposition 3 with the numerical tech-
niques developed in Refs. [17], allows us to calculate the
secret key rate, but analytical estimates and the adapta-
tion of the decoy state method are also desirable.
Finally, let us note that, originally, the Devetak–
Winter formula for the secret key rate (12) is valid only
for collective Eve’s attacks: Eve prepares the state ρ⊗NABE
where N is the number of sendings. For the asymptotic
case N → ∞, the most general, coherent attacks are re-
duced to the collective attacks using the de Finetti rep-
resentation [5], so, this is not an actual restriction. For
finite N , the entropy accumulation technique [38] can be
used for better finite-size corrections. However, a con-
crete formula using this technique is to be elaborated.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
Let us define the function
F (x, y) = 2y log(2x − 1) + 2h(y)− x+ 2 (A1)
for x > 0 and y ∈ [0, 1]. We can see that F (x, 0) < 0
and F (x, 1/2) > 0 for x ≥ 3. Hence, for any fixed x ≥ 3,
F (x, y) has a root denoted by y = f(x). Since F (x, 1) > 0
for x ≥ 3 and F is concave with respect to y, there are no
more roots of F (x, y). For x = n denote f(x) = p
min,(n)
01 .
Now let us prove that p
min,(n)
01 is a non-decreasing func-
tion of n for n ≥ 3. It is sufficient to prove that f ′(x) ≥ 0
for x ≥ 3. We have
f ′(x) = −F
′
x(x, f(x))
F ′y(x, f(x))
. (A2)
F ′y(x, y) > 0 for y ≤ 1/2,
F ′x(x, y) =
2y
1− 2−x − 1 < 0 for y <
1− 2−x
2
. (A3)
Hence, we should prove that
f(x) <
1− 2−x
2
. (A4)
Indeed, since h(y) > 0 for 0 < y < 1 and, as can be
proved,
(1− 2−x) log(2x − 1)− x+ 2 > 0 (A5)
(x = 1 yields the minimal value to the right-hand side
equal to one), we obtain F (x, (1 − 2−x)/2) > 0, which
implies Ineq. (A4). The lemma has been proved.
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Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 3
1. First, let us observe that δ˜Lx is a decreasing function
of p
(3+)
det . This can be proved by direct inspection of the
rational function δ˜Lx (p
(3+)
det ) using the inequalities
p1 − p(2),U1 ≤ p1 − p(2)1 ≤ pdet − p(2)det. (B1)
2. Let us prove that δ˜Lx ≤ 1 or, equivalently,
tL1 − 2qL1 − p(1),Ldet ≤ 0 (B2)
in the points
(
0, p
(3+),U
det
)
. Obviously, Ineq. (B2) is
true for the point (0, 0) because this is the case of the
single-photon Bob’s input and δ˜Lx coincides with δx (see
Eqs. (65)). δx ≤ 1 due to positivity of ρ(1)AB. Since δ˜Lx
decreases with p
(3+)
det , Ineq. (B2) is also satisfied in the
points
(
0, p
(3+),U
det
)
.
3. Since the left-hand side of Ineq. (B2) is a convex
function of p
(2)
det and due to the result of the previous
paragraph, the equality in Ineq. (B2) can be achieved in
at most one point p
(2)
det.
4. Under the conditions of Theorem 1,
p
(2),U
det < pdet − p(3+),Udet . (B3)
and δLx = 1 whenever p
(2)
det = p
(2),U
det . Indeed, in the inverse
case, since tL1−2qU1 > 0 for all p(2)det ≤ p(2),Udet , we have δLx →
+∞ as p(2)det → p(2),Udet . With the result of paragraph 2, this
means that, in some point p
(2)
det < p
(2),U
det , δ
L
x reaches the
value 1. This contradicts the definition of p
(2),U
det .
From paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, it follows that δLx ≤
1 (and, hence, the expression under minimization in
Ineq. (30) is well-defined) for all p
(2)
det ≤ p(2),Udet .
5. Let us prove that
(
p
(2)
det, p
(3+)
det
)
/∈ D whenever p(2)det > p(2),Udet . (B4)
By the results of the paragraph 4, δ˜Lx > 1 for(
p
(2)
det, p
(3+),U
det
)
whenever p
(2)
det > p
(2),U
det . Since δ˜
L
x is a de-
creasing function of p
(3+)
det , the same is true for all pairs(
p
(2)
det, p
(3+)
det
)
with p
(2)
det > p
(2),U
det and p
(3+)
det ≤ p(3+),Udet ,
which proves Eq. (B4).
6. By the conditions of Theorem 1, δ˜Lx > 0 in all points(
p
(2)
det, p
(3+),U
det
)
such that p
(2)
det ≤ p(2),Udet . Since δ˜Lx decreases
with p
(3+)
det and due to Eq. (B4), δ˜
L
x > 0 in D.
7. Then, the right-hand side of Ineq. (109) is a de-
creasing function of p
(3+)
det because both the factor p
(1)
det
before (1 − h) and δ˜Lx > 0 are decreasing functions of
p
(3+)
det . Hence, the maximal possible value p
(3+),U
det of p
(3+)
det
corresponds to the minimal secret key rate for a given
p
(2)
det.
Hence, minimization of the right-hand side of
Ineq. (109) over
(
p
(2)
det, p
(3)
det
) ∈ D is reduced to the min-
imization over p
(2)
det ∈
[
0, p
(2),U
det
]
with p
(3+)
det = p
(3+),U
det .
This proves formula (30).
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 4
For arbitrary x, y and an arbitrary 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, we have
txh
(
1
2
− g(x)
x
)
+ (1− t)yh
(
1
2
− g(y)
y
)
= [tx+ (1− t)y]
{
tx
tx+ (1− t)y h
(
1
2
− g(x)
x
)
+
(1− t)y
tx+ (1− t)y h
(
1
2
− g(y)
y
)}
≤ [tx+ (1− t)y]h
(
1
2
− tg(x) + (1− t)g(y)
tx+ (1− t)y
)
≤ [tx+ (1− t)y]h
(
1
2
− g(tx+ (1− t)y)
tx+ (1− t)y
)
, (C1)
q.e.d. The first inequality comes from concavity of h
and the second inequality comes from convexity of g and
monotonicity of h.
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